

ARTICLE APPEARED
 ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON POST
 24 October 1984

Middle-Level CIA Officials Cleared Manual

By Bob Woodward
 Washington Post Staff Writer

Members of the covert-operations division at CIA headquarters here, not senior officials, reviewed and approved a guerrilla-warfare manual advising Nicaraguan rebels on "selective use of violence" to "neutralize carefully selected and planned targets," according to Reagan administration officials.

The officials said yesterday that there was confusion about use of the word "neutralize" and that it was not intended to mean or imply assassinations, strictly prohibited by presidential order.

In addition, the officials said, some CIA personnel reviewing the manual at headquarters or in Central America, where it was initially drafted, could not read the Spanish version.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), one of two senators who attended a CIA briefing Monday about the manual, said yesterday, "It is my conclusion after reading the manual that the word 'neutralize' is subject to interpretation but could be interpreted by reasonable people to mean assassination . . . and thousands of copies should not have been sent out, as was the case.

"Review did take place in Washington, but [CIA briefers] were vague as to who [conducted the review] . . . we need more answers," he said.

Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), with Nunn at the briefing, said the original document was in English and called for government officials to be "removed." That meant "removed from effectiveness and in no way meant assassination," he said.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, for which the briefing was given, said yesterday that it plans an investigation next week.

Administration officials said CIA Director William J. Casey and other senior agency officials did not approve the manual and were unaware of it until asked about it this month by the Associated Press.

Officials said an internal CIA investigation has determined that, at most, about a dozen middle- and low-level CIA personnel reviewed or handled the manual after a contract employee drafted it last year. In the process, some portions of the initial draft that advised hiring criminals and creating martyrs were deleted before 2,000 copies were published.

Other sources said investigators have had difficulty determining the chain of command involved and said Casey is disturbed that facts about the process seem to change from day to day.

Investigators initially believed last week that all paragraphs thought to be offensive had been removed before the manual was distributed. In Sunday's presidential debate, President Reagan said only 12 uncensored copies were circulated. It is now apparent that these accounts are incomplete.

Deanna Hammond, a translator for the Congressional Research Service, which made an English-language version of the manual for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said yesterday that the Spanish and English versions of the manual's controversial parts are so similar that even someone unfamiliar with Spanish should not have been confused by them.

She said that the word "neutralize" was "*neutralizarse*" in the Spanish version and that the verb in its various forms has no other English meaning. The phrase "selective use of violence," she said, is also very similar in its Spanish version, "*uso selectivo de la violencia*."

An administration official said the manual was drawn up from insurgency manuals available to the CIA as long ago as the Vietnam war era. The official said all copies of the manual are being withdrawn.

Wallop said that he has read the 90-page manual and that, "taken as a whole, the manual calls for the avoidance of violence to the extent

possible and was designed to put restraint and a rationale on guerrilla operations . . . As a whole, the manual is a code of conduct for which the United States ought not to be ashamed."

Wallop said Casey has "been responsible and forthright on this and, when the political season is over, people will see this for what it is."

Vice President Bush, a former CIA director, said yesterday in Wisconsin that the controversial language "could mean various things." He added, "... You're dealing with an awful lot of brutality, a lot of loss of life down there."

The CIA investigation is being conducted by its deputy inspector general because Inspector General John Stein headed the covert-operations division last year when the manual was written, reviewed and distributed.

Officials said the investigation has cleared Stein and the CIA's No. 2 official, John N. McMahon, of involvement with or knowledge of the manual.

"I've heard nothing to conclude one way or the other whether senior officials [approved the manual] or not . . .," Nunn said yesterday. "I would think the review process would be tight and far up the line."

Nunn said Monday's three-hour briefing suggested to him that the CIA has "serious problems in management and control over covert operations." He added, "When you are going to publish thousands of copies of a sensitive document in a sensitive operation, [top managers] should know."

Monday's briefing was conducted by two officials from the covert-operations division who have held their jobs less than a month, officials said, and several persons at the session later voiced frustration about what they termed imprecise answers.

Nunn said the controversy highlights a serious problem with covert operations in Nicaragua only because the administration's chief reason for them is purportedly interdiction of arms from there to leftist rebels in El Salvador. The Nicaraguan rebels, known as contras, are seeking overthrow of the Sandinista government.

"The long-term questions are the management of covert operations and whether [the United States] can enter into this kind of limited operation when the contras have another purpose," Nunn said.

Administration officials familiar with the three-year secret war in Nicaragua said terror tactics outlined in the manual are grim and should not necessarily surprise anyone but are almost inevitable outgrowths of such a covert plan.

National Security Council records indicate that the initial Nicaraguan operation plan, drafted in November 1981, was to "work primarily through non-Americans" against the Cuban presence in Nicaragua but that, in some cases, the CIA was to "take unilateral paramilitary action—possibly using U.S. personnel—against special Cuban targets."

C-1

WASHINGTON TIMES
11 October 1984

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

Who runs the CIA?

The magnification of power and influence of the CIA career bureaucracy, represented by John J. McMahon, the CIA deputy director, over President Reagan's personal appointee, CIA Director William J. Casey, is the untold story of the Reagan administration. It is today a matter of legitimate doubt among highly informed observers that even President Reagan's orders to the CIA to undertake covert operations could prevail over a McMahon veto.

To obtain confirmation or denial of the foregoing statements is impossible: understandably, because the CIA rarely discusses for publication the organization's inner workings. However, persons in a position to know and observe the CIA and who are free of organizational inhibitions clearly believe that the CIA career service has achieved a degree of power unparalleled in the intelligence agency's 37-year existence.

The reason for the disagreement between Mr. Casey and the McMahon career bureaucracy is not that the Reagan-Casey ideas are so off the wall that Mr. McMahon and his aides must rescue CIA professionalism from the antics of political appointees. CIA professional judgments have in the past proven to be misjudgments. CIA analysts, it is now known, have over the years been spectacularly wrong in their underestimates of Soviet

armaments expenditures, while outside experts have been correct. The CIA permanent staff has never had a monopoly on wisdom.

The continuing Casey-McMahon disagreement is based on how best to implement Reagan policies via the CIA. The White House endeavor to push the CIA into a more activist role via covert-action programs seems thus far to have been frustrated.

For example, following Soviet destruction of the Korean Air Lines passenger plane in September 1983, President Reagan is said to have ordered Mr. Casey to retaliate against the U.S.S.R. by shipping a quantity of surface-to-air missiles to the embattled Afghan mujahideen battling the then four-year-old Soviet invasion. Mr. McMahon succeeded in preventing execution of the proposal, arguing that it would be too difficult to accomplish. He may have been right or wrong; whichever it was, Mr. McMahon's view prevailed.

Another example: Some 200 Soviet soldiers are known to be either prisoners or deserters in the hands of Afghan resistance fighters. Mr. Casey proposed, with President Reagan's support, bringing to the United States about 65 Soviet POWs for a mass press

conference. Such a move would have served two purposes:

First, it would have relieved the Afghans of a burden. POWs are generally a problem — what do you do with them? — in a guerrilla war characterized by hit-and-run tactics.

Second, such a prisoner show with Red Army soldiers telling their story to the world media might have been a stunning blow against Soviet imperial interests in Central Asia. Mr. McMahon vetoed the idea and his veto stuck. Again, Mr. McMahon might have been right or wrong; whichever it was, his view prevailed.

The CIA career bureaucracy

opposed from the outset the mining of Nicaragua waters. Whatever plan the McMahon forces finally offered for interdicting military supplies to Nicaragua failed to do the job, so, as the saying goes in Washington, it was "all onus and no bonus." The congressional uproar as a result of the mining is said to

have strengthened Mr. McMahon's position vis-a-vis Mr. Casey.

These are some of the passages in the continuing battle between the Casey CIA and the McMahon CIA, with permanent possession of the trophy seemingly in the hands of the CIA professionals, who have also managed to prevent any significant number of new Casey appointees from entering CIA

ranks. In fact, of five Casey executive appointees, only two remain and it is not certain how much influence they have in the organization today.

Whether this situation would change in the event of Director Casey's promised reappointment during a possible second Reagan term remains to be seen.

One of the major reasons for this power accretion to the CIA old-boy network is the formalization of congressional oversight of the intelligence agency in two select permanent committees of the Congress. Dissenters within the CIA from Reagan-Casey covert action proposals now have a forum where their dissent can be heard and debated inside the committees.

Instead of the usual hierarchical arrangements within a government department, there are now lateral CIA staff connections with Congress which has institutionalized its constitutional power to oversee the executive branch. Until the mid-1970s, congressional oversight of the CIA was informal. This function was pretty much left in the hands of ranking members of senior congressional committees who, themselves, in the good old Allen Dulles days, preferred not to probe too deeply into what the CIA was doing. As a result of House and Senate investigations in the aftermath of Watergate, Congress successfully asserted its power over the intelligence agency.

There are those, however, who disagree with this analysis. They counter-argue that the problem lies not with the congressional committees but with Director Casey himself. The incumbent has not exercised his own power to the same degree as did Adm. Stanfield Turner, President Carter's CIA director, who, as one observer said, "whether you agreed with him or not, ran the CIA."

Watergate, the Nixon resignation and the short-lived Ford adminis-

CIA shuffle continues

Washington (News Bureau)—CIA general counsel Stanley Sporkin was nominated for a federal judgeship yesterday, continuing a shuffle of the intelligence agency's top ranks.

Spokesman Dale Peterson said that Sporkin's expected departure, announced by the White House, was unrelated to

four job shifts disclosed on Wednesday.

John Stein, former head of clandestine services, is to become the CIA's inspector general; Clair George, head of congressional liaison, will succeed Stein; Charles Briggs, CIA executive director, replaces George, and James Taylor, currently the inspec-

tor general, replaces Briggs.

CIA DIRECTOR William Casey and Deputy Director John McMahon were not affected by the moves.

Peterson said that the changes were routine, and denied that they were related to controversies involving CIA support for Nicaraguan guerrillas.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
29 June 1984

CIA transfers 4, denies link to covert operations

By Storer Rowley
Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—The CIA is transferring its controversial chief legislative liaison and replacing him with the agency's third-highest official, a CIA spokesman disclosed Wednesday.

Clair George, installed last summer by CIA Director William Casey as head of the agency's congressional liaison office, will become director of clandestine operations, spokesman Dale Peterson said in a rare disclosure of four key personnel changes at the agency.

Charles Briggs, now executive director of the agency and in charge of its day-to-day operations, will replace George in the liaison position, which has become highly sensitive because of recent strains in the relationship between the agency and Congress.

Some members of Congress expressed displeasure with the CIA last April, claiming that they were not adequately informed of the Reagan administration's involvement in the secret mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

PETERSON SAID the four moves were unrelated to administration concern over Congress' rejection Monday of President Reagan's request for an additional \$21 million to finance covert operations against the leftist government in Nicaragua.

Rather, Peterson said, the moves are part of a "routine rotation" of high-level CIA personnel in which the current director of clandestine operations, John Stein, will become inspector general and the current CIA inspector general, James Taylor, will become executive director.

A congressional intelligence source said, "It's rather difficult to tell whether or not this is a smoke screen" because "there are personnel changes at the CIA every year about this time." But he said strained relations between Congress and the CIA started last summer.

"I really think there's a direct correlation—although it would be terribly hard to prove—that a lot of these problems are more intense

since last August," the source said. George, he added, "can't be held up to blame for all this, [but] he shares a good deal of it," along with Casey.

PETERSON, in a telephone interview Wednesday night, said: "This is not to be considered any kind of a shake-up. Nobody is being demoted. These are all high-level positions, and they're moving from one position to another."

However, Peterson acknowledged that "certainly the appointment of Briggs to the liaison position is an indication of the interest in [and] high importance of that position."

He said the moves were approved by Casey and the deputy CIA director, John McMahon, two weeks ago

and announced internally at that time, to become effective Sunday.

The CIA does not routinely make public such changes.

The agency's disagreement with Congress last April was quieted when Casey personally apologized to the Senate Intelligence Committee and promised to give notice of significant intelligence activities in the future. But the highly publicized disagreement that led to the apology claimed headlines for days and brought the glare of public attention to the administration's "secret war" against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

SEN. BARRY Goldwater [R., Ariz.], committee chairman, described the CIA-directed mining as

"an act of war," and Sen. Daniel Moynihan [D., N.Y.] resigned for a time from his post as committee vice chairman in protest.

Committee officials claimed then that the difficulty of getting information about covert CIA operations intensified after Casey installed George, a 30-year CIA veteran, as head of the congressional liaison office last summer, shortly before stepped-up covert activity in Nicaragua.

"Now, prior to that we had a good working relationship," said a staffer, adding that since then staff members seeking information to carry out their oversight duties had been "maligned, mistreated, even yelled at."

STAT